Tuesday, November 5, 2019

Travesty – A directory and file enumeration tool (post directory traversal exploitation)

About a year and a half ago, our team was working on an assessment where we had root access to a server via a directory traversal, but we couldn’t convert that to a working shell because of several restrictions on the server and a very strong password policy that was implemented i.e. /etc/shadow passwords could not be cracked during the assessment timeframe. We still knew that we had access to a very valuable target though.

It became quite difficult for us to progress on the assessment as we couldn’t see any files and directories on the server which may be unique, taking this into account Dino and Manny came up with the simple idea of downloading the mlocate database (since we had the required privileges luckily). The mlocate database is quite a mess if you open it directly in any text editor, but we were lucky enough to find pymlocate(https://github.com/salexan2001/pymlocate) which assisted us in obtaining a really neatly formatted file of directory structures on the target machine. Thanks to Alexander Schlemmer (salexan2001)  for creating it.

We then created our own tool, called Travesty, which allowed us to automate the entire process, requiring  just the vulnerable traversal URL and an output filename. 

Utilising the tool has proved to be extremely useful over the course of this year on various assessments and it’s a great way to quickly find valuable information, files and directories on a target, that you wouldn’t normally know of on the machine.

We’ve decided to release the small script to the public, in order to assist analysts in their day to day jobs – if it even helps one security analyst, we’re happy!

We’ve released the tool on our Github at:


There’s a lot of work to be done and things that we want to add to it, but for now it does the job(just!).


In action screenshot:
Output formatting:

Happy Hacking!

Thursday, September 12, 2019

Solving the BFS Ekoparty 2019 Exploitation Challenge

This is a quick write up about how one of our team members, Thanasis, solved the challenge for EkoParty 2019. This was a fun challenge and thanks to Lukas and Nico from Blue Frost Security for making it happen(and for supporting our community).
More information about the challenge can be found at:
The application as the requirements provided, need to run in windows 10 x64 (RS6) version and the goal is to bypass ASLR and execute a calc.exe process .
By opening the application we can see via netstat that it binds on port 54321 on (all the machine’s interfaces).
By opening Ghidra and going to the main function it is obvious that some checks need to bypassed in order to correctly send a payload to the application.
In Ghidra, if we check the function that is called after the new connection is accepted, we see this: 

Upon first check, it checks for the first 0x10 bytes(16 chars) as a header. 
The second and third checks: If the header starts with 0x393130326f6b45(Ekoparty2019) then we are allowed to send a user_message as long as it is smaller than 0x201 bytes(513 chars).
The last fourth check is quite important, we can send all this packet structure but it needs to be aligned correctly for 8 bytes. Meaning we could send 16,24,32 and so on.
After we succeed in sending a big buffer, it appears that the application crashes after 529 bytes or so. By sending 528 bytes structured correctly with the cookie included in the beginning, we notice that before the calling function sub_140001170, we actually control the RAX, which is the 513 bytes.
Before this, there is this instruction
lea     rcx, unk_7FF6A8A9E520
 unk_7FF6A8A9E520, holds an array with this structure

By sending the 513 characters, for example as A or \x41 we can make it so the function will return our byte + the rest of the pattern. In this case c3c3c3c3 + ourbyte+488b01.
The function sub_140001170 before it returns this value turns it to little endian, making it ourbyte+488b01c3c3c3c3. So we get 41488b01c3c3c3c3.
This value will be used in WriteProcessMemory as lpBuffer, basically copying these bytes to the function sub_7FF6A8A91000 as instructions allowing to control what we can execute when we reach it.
Although this is quite good, it provides a limitation of instructions, meaning we can only use instructions byte+488b01c3c3c3c3.
I made a quick script in python producing all the values in a file
start ="848b01c3c3c3"
for i in xrange(byte,endbyte+1):
            print format(i,'X')+ start
With a one-liner bash I got all the values:
for i in $(cat list_instructions);do echo -e "\n$i" && rasm2 -b 64 -D $i ; done  > instructions

One good thing in this case is that we can actually control the RCX from our input buffer with the characters provided from 513 till 528.
The first thing I had to do was, get the process address from PEB.
By sending in our payload these are the last bytes: 
We could achieve and acquire the PEB. \x65 is meant for the combination from the previous instructions.
0:  65 48 8b 01             mov    rax,QWORD PTR gs:[rcx]
4:  c3                      ret

It is well known that in x64 bit windows, GS register is a special register which points to PEB by providing the accurate offset. In this case since we could control RCX, we pointer GS directly to the PEB which is at offset 0x60 hence the highlighting.
Since the application will always sends us back the data leaked we can get this address and use it.
The next step would be to get the Image Base Address of the application.
Image Base Address is located from the PEB + 0x10 offset. In this case we had to set the address + 0x10 as a pointer to RCX to be able to leak the address.
In this case, according to our possible instructions we chose:
0:  47 8b 01                mov    rax,QWORD PTR [rcx]
3:  c3                      ret
The first byte 47 and these as before are the last bytes of our payload:
“\x47\x65\x65\x65\x65\x65\x65\x65 + address+0x10”

As an end goal we need to create a ROP chain to execute calc.exe.
Since we would like to bypass ASLR, leakage is already useful but in case we would need to execute something, we would have to bypass DEP as well.
In this case it is good that we have, in the beginning of the application, a winexec call.

Therefore, in the end we will call calc.exe through winexec but, winexec requires that the application will be executed to be pointed at, hence a pointer that points to the string calc.exe and a null terminator.
Somehow I had to be able to find that place in memory with my string. The best way was to get the StackBase Limit and get towards the stack base to find where it is.
First, I had to leak StackBase Limit.
StackBaseLimit is in the TEB at 0x10 offset through the GS register.
The initial request I used :
0:  65 48 8b 01             mov    rax,QWORD PTR gs:[rcx]
4:  c3                      ret
I controlled the RCX by setting it to 0x10.
After actually getting the leaked address of the Stack Base Limit, it is time for a loop towards the Stack Base to find the correct string which would be calc.exe.
By doing a loop, I started leaking the memory cells of the stack up to a point where it detected my string.
The moment the string was found, I saved into a counter and multiplied by 0x08 to get how many cells down the stack I had to go.
So now I had the address of the string.
In the above scenario I used: 
0:  47 8b 01                mov    rax,QWORD PTR [rcx]
3:  c3                      ret

With RCX as the Stack Base Limit and constantly adding 0x08 to it.
The next step would be to get the winexec’s address on the stack. By checking the .rdata of the application I could see the offset of it.

In this case, I need to leak the address from Image Base Address + 0x9010 offset.
By using exactly the same instructions as before:
0:  47 8b 01                mov    rax,QWORD PTR [rcx]
3:  c3                      ret
Then adding RCX as the Image Base Address+0x9010 , I get the leaked address for Winexec on the stack.
For the final request to the application I used 
0:  51                      push   rcx
1:  48 8b 01                mov    rax,QWORD PTR [rcx]
4:  c3                      ret

I set the RCX to a pivot gadget “add rsp,78h ; ret”, so I can stack pivot.
I used Ropper and rp++ to get gadgets out of the application.
Thankfully, the ret instruction gets us to a point in our buffer.
According to MSDN Wincalc requires 2 arguments, the name of the application and a number which will set the mode of the window.
In windows 10 x64 , the calling convention is rcx,rdx,r8,r9 and top of the stack.
The structure of the packet is this. The whole packet is the cookie + 528 characters.
|16 junk bytes| - padding
|pop_rax_gadget| - Pop Image Base Address for having a valid address on RAX because the only pop rdx and pop rdx gadgets set bad values to it.
|Image Base Address – 0x08| - valid address
|pop_rdx_gadget| - pop rdx gadget to put 0x01 for the Wincalc second argument.
|0x01|- Winexec UINT   uCmdShow
|pop_rax_gadget| - again for the same reason that the pop rcx gadget will set bad value to rax
|pop_rcx_gadget| - set the pointer address that points to calc.exe\x00
|address_pointing_calc| - address that points to calc.exe\x00
|72 junk bytes| - padding
|ret_gadget| - just a return gadget to fix the stack alignment to 16-byte format, because CreateProcessA is called inside the Winexec function which includes movabs instruction. Movabs instructions check if the stack is aligned and if not it will raise an exception.
|winexec_leaked_address| - winexec address on the stack.
|add_rsp_0x78| - adds to current RSP + 0x78 bytes to reach the next stack pivot.
|120 junk bytes| - padding.
|add_rsp_0x78| - adds to current RSP + 0x78 bytes to reach the next stack pivot.
|120 junk bytes| - padding.
|add_rsp_0x28| - adds to current RSP + 0x28 bytes to reach the next stack pivot.
|40 junk bytes| - padding.
|add_rsp_0x58| - adds to current RSP + 0x58 bytes to reach the original return pointer address and continue the execution of the application instead of crashing it.
|8 junk bytes| - padding.
|calc.exe\x00| - string to set in memory.
|15 junk bytes| - padding.

Gadgets Used:
0x14000158b: add rsp, 0x78 ; ret  ;  

0x0000000140004525: pop rdx; add byte ptr [rax], al; cmp word ptr [rax], cx; je 0x4530; xor eax, eax; ret; 

0x140001167: pop rax ; ret  ; 

0x00000001400089ab: pop rcx; or byte ptr [rax], al; add byte ptr [rax - 0x77], cl; add eax, 0x4b12; add rsp, 0x48; ret;

0x0000000140001164: add rsp, 0x58; ret; 

0x14000158f: ret  ;  

0x00000001400011d5: add rsp, 0x28; ret;

The full working exploit can be downloaded here from our Github:
Mandatory calc.exe POC screenshot:

Friday, August 30, 2019

TSA-2019-001: Asus Precision TouchPad (Pool Overflow)

Telspace Systems Security Advisory

TSA-2019-001: Asus Precision TouchPad (Pool Overflow)
CVE number: CVE-2019-10709


The AsusPTPFilter.sys driver on the Asus Precision TouchPad hardware has a Pool Overflow associated with the \\.\AsusTPdevice, leading to a DoS and could potentially lead to privilege escalation via a crafted DeviceIoControl call with a specific IOCTL code.




Asus Precision TouchPad



Proof of Concept:

Details and crash information:

Vendor response:

The vendor has patched the vulnerability and released a new version. 

Disclosure Timeline:

25-03-2019 – Initial Discovery
27-03-2019 – Vendor Notification
29-08-2019 – Vendor Patch
30-08-2019 – Public Disclosure


This vulnerability was discovered by Athanasios Tserpelis of Telspace Systems

Wednesday, June 12, 2019

Giving back - Child Survivors of Crime (C.S.O.C)

Last month (May 2019) Telspace was once again a sponsor at the ITWeb Security Summit 2019, for more information on the ITWeb Security Summit refer to: http://v2.itweb.co.za/event/itweb/security-summit-2019/
In addition to sponsoring this local conference, Telspace proudly ran a charity initiative on the days of the summit whereby we gave out original Telspace branded t-shirts to delegates (with a twist). 

Every year we donate an amount to a charity for each t-shirt we give out, this year that amount was R40.00 per shirt. However, we also decided to try and give back more to the chosen charity and had a donation box at the stand. If a delegate wanted a t-shirt, a small donation (of any value) was requested in return for the t-shirt. Amazingly, thanks to the generous delegates at the summit, the donations box raised R3 296.10 over the 2 days. We thank you all for your generous contributions to this amazing initiative.

The chosen charity for this year was Child Survivors of Crime (C.S.O.C). This wonderful charity creates a rainbow after the storm for children affected by crime. Support is individually tailored to the specific needs of each child because each one’s circumstances are unique. They offer this support via psychological, material, educational, peer and general assistance. Should you like more information on this charity and / or to assist in contributing in some way, please do not hesitate to view their website and get in touch by going to: http://childsurvivors.org.za/. This goes in line with one of our Junior Analyst's research topic for 2019 (Hi Delicia!).

In addition to the generous R3 296.10 raised, Telspace will be donating an additional R 8 000.00 (200 shirts x R40), making a total of R11 296.10 that will be donated to this amazing charity and initiative! We would like to say a huge thank you to all of the delegates that donated and participated in this initiative as well as our staff for getting involved! 

It should be noted that the t-shirts contain a hidden challenge, if you received a t-shirt, find the challenge, solve it and play along to see where it may take you! 

We would like to take this opportunity to once again say thank you to our staff, everyone that visited our stand and to everyone that showed support for Telspace Systems and in particular C.S.O.C. THANK YOU!

Thursday, May 16, 2019

BSidesTLV - Proud Supporters

This year, Telspace Systems had a goal of giving back as much as we could to the information security community. This ranged from internships, research, free workshops, community based sponsorships and free training.

In line with this, we're very proud to announce that we'll be sponsoring BSides Tel Aviv 2019 (https://bsidestlv.com/), which will be hosted at Tel Aviv University, Israel.  We are very proud of the local community in Israel, and are happy to be supporting our friends and colleagues through our sponsorship of the conference as well as providing our Ethical Hacking 101 training course.

It also gives us great pride and joy to announce that we will be giving back 100% of the proceeds of our workshop to the local BSides TLV community, which is in line with our 2019 goals. We hope to see more companies doing this in order to grow the information security space worldwide and give back as much as possible to our amazing industry.

For more information about our training that we will be offering in Tel Aviv, click here:

https://bsidestlv.com/workshops/ethical-hacking-101/ . 

Registration for BSides TLV can completed at https://bsidestlv.com/register-2019/ .

We hope to see you there!

Wednesday, May 1, 2019

Put Words In My Mouth

Put Words In My Mouth | Telspace Systems Intern Research
By Amy Manià

Money has been withdrawn from your account.

You don’t remember making, or authorising that transaction.

When you follow up with the bank, they say you called earlier and requested the transfer – it was, after-all, you speaking – right? Unbeknownst to you, your voice was stolen, and so was your money.

With the rise of voice authentication biometrics, so too will the opportunities to spoof it. Text-to-Speech APIs are constantly improving, for example, Google’s technology is able to create voices that are indistinguishable from recordings made by the real-life human speaker.

Threat actors have access to a target’s voice recordings through passive channels such as YouTube videos, social media posts etc.  More active / invasive channels an attacker could use would be to compromise vulnerable IoT devices which are becoming more common place throughout homes and offices. Social media posts and IoT devices would allow threat actors to listen to a voice, capture and then manipulate it (all using free online tools).

So what exactly can be done with a ‘stolen’ voice? This research explores the vulnerabilities in IoT devices, the legal landscape surrounding these devices and the various voice cloning, authentication and recognition software currently available. The report culminates by examining the possibilities of banking fraud, by using voice-spoofing to bypass authentication and transfer funds. The report includes a demonstration of the simulated attack on a bank.

Download the full Telspace Systems research paper here which was written by Amy: 

Tuesday, March 5, 2019

Telspace Systems Internship/Boot camp, March 2019

We are excited and proud to announce that our boot camp / internship kicked off yesterday!  

After approximately 100 thorough interviews, which covered a number of areas, we have secured 10 new interns. The areas we covered during the interview stage, to name a few were: 

Networking, Linux, Windows, Software Development and Exploitation, Cryptography and general information security knowledge.  

From a statistics perspective, the weakest area identified was cryptography (a future post on interview statistics is planned!)

We believe our internship / boot camp surpasses the industry “norm” due to the following reasons:

  • Our internships don’t have any monetary restraint attached to them and interns will be paid a monthly salary whilst they are undertaking the training with us, also, there are no restraints where the interns will have to pay back money if they don’t work for Telspace for a period of time. Doing anything else but this would only benefit the company itself, rather than the community. 
  • If interns don’t feel they are a match at Telspace Systems during the boot camp, they are free to go, taking with them the knowledge that we passed on to them as well as any certifications (and we are more than happy with that!).
  • Should our interns pass the assessment criteria at the end of the boot camp, via different assessment gateways (including a research gateway), they will be offered a full-time junior analyst position at Telspace Systems (which they don’t have to take!), with this offer there will be additional training / certifications provided.
  • This boot camp is about growing the community, and thereafter, our company in order to service our customers better in the future.  

We will be hosting a few more boot camp throughout the year, so keep your eyes peeled if you are interested in taking part in one!

Good luck to all our new interns, we hope to see many shells and calcs being popped!

Wednesday, January 9, 2019

Looking back on 2018 and forward to great things in 2019!

As we enter a new year Telspace would like to look back on 2018 and thank everyone who made 2018 a great and exciting year. We have had the pleasure of attending a number of conferences where we were able to present, train and share ideas with like-minded individuals. This blog post provides an overview of some of the highlights this year, if we have missed anything let us know in the comments below!
We kicked the year off by hiring William Boshoff as our Chief Technical Officer (CTO), this was and still is part of our constant drive to continuously innovate and improve our services to clients. William believes that cultivating a culture of continual growth, learning and development directly translates into greater value for Telspace’s clients.
William’s experience ranges from assessing and consulting in high security environments, mostly in the finance and government sectors, through to lecturing and contributing as a subject matter expert on multiple boards.
In his spare time, William enjoys contributing to the information security community by sharing his research, mentoring and developing zero-day exploits.   
William Boshoff (Telsace Systems CTO)

Telspace has also smashed international borders and expanded internationally to the UK, Egypt and Palestine! If you are interested and PASSIONATE, we are hiring!

Local is Lekker

Telspace has always been very close to the local (South African) infosec community and we believe in giving back. In line with this Telspace sponsored BSides Cape Town 2018, where we were proud to run a “selfies for charity” fundraiser for the South African Depression and Anxiety Group (@TheSADAG). 

Telspace Crew at BSides Cape Town 2018 (left to right): Manny Corregedor, Derek Scott, Ayaz Saiyed

Some “selfies for charity” at BSides Cape Town 2018

Telspace also spoke at ITWeb’s Security Summit 2018, gave training (Ethical Hacking 101) and exhibited. Our CEO, Dino Covotsos and COO, Manny Corregedor, were both part of the advisory board for 2018. The conference was well attended and had great international speakers such as Mikko Hyppönen, April Wright, Jayson Street and Rodrigo Branco who gave keynotes.

We also got the opportunity to catchup with the international speakers who are old / good friends of Telspace Systems employees and made a charitable donation to CANSA for every Telspace t-shirt that was given away to attendees that visited our stand.  We also exhibited at the Department of Defence supplier day which was well attended.

Left to right: Tarryn Hardman (Telspace Systems), Sibusiso Nxumalo (Former-Telspace Systems Employee), Rodrigo Branco (Intel), Manny Corregedor (Telspace Systems)

Left to right: Mikko Hyppönen (F-Secure), Dino Covotsos (Telspace Systems)
Manny Corregedor(Telspace Systems) giving a talk on ‘Information Security Cakes’ at the ITWeb Security Summit 2018

Telspace Systems Stand at the Department of Defence Supplier Day 2018

Going abroad!

Throughout the year we also participated in international conferences, round table events and provided comments on news stories in the media.
In addition to supporting local events, we also attended Blackhat, Defcon 26 and BSides in Las Vegas.
Our CEO Dino Covotsos also gave talks at:
  • Defcon 26 2018 – Recon Village (Las Vegas, USA)
  • Hack In The Box 2018 (Dubai)
  • Hackers to Hackers 2018, H2HC (Sao Paulo, Brazil)
Dino was also listed as one of the security researchers that was thanked by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) in recognition of making Microsoft online services safer by finding and reporting security vulnerabilities. More information at: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/researcher-acknowledgments-online-services-archive

Dino Covotsos giving a talk on Hacking the RFQ Process at Hackers to Hackers (Brazil)
Left to right: Dino Covotsos (Telspace Systems), Rodrigo Branco (Intel)

SACICON 2018 Badges

Left to right: Jayson Street, Nina Alli and Dino Covotsos at SACICON (Brazil)

Hack In The Box 2018 (Dubai)
Dino Covotsos giving a talk on Hacking the RFQ Process at Hack In The Box 2018 (Dubai)

Thank you!

We would like to thank everyone who made our 2018 year so amazing, a huge thank you to our staff, clients, employees, friends and most importantly the local Information Security community.   We wish you all the best and a prosperous year for 2019.